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Abstract—Securing cyber-physical systems (CPS) against malicious attacks is of paramount importance because these attacks may
cause irreparable damages to physical systems. Recent studies have revealed that control programs running on CPS devices suffer
from both control-oriented attacks (e.g., code-injection or code-reuse attacks) and data-oriented attacks (e.g., non-control data
attacks). Unfortunately, existing detection mechanisms are insufficient to detect runtime data-oriented exploits, due to the lack of
runtime execution semantics checking. In this work, we propose Orpheus, a new security methodology for defending against
data-oriented attacks by enforcing cyber-physical execution semantics. We first present a general method for reasoning cyber-physical
execution semantics of a control program (i.e., causal dependencies between the physical context/event and program control flows),
including the event identification and dependence analysis. As an instantiation of Orpheus, we then present a new program behavior
model, i.e., the event-aware finite-state automaton (eFSA). eFSA takes advantage of the event-driven nature of CPS control programs
and incorporates event checking in anomaly detection. It detects data-oriented exploits if a specific physical event is missing along with
the corresponding event dependent state transition. We evaluate our prototype’s performance by conducting case studies under
data-oriented attacks. Results show that eFSA can successfully detect different runtime attacks. Our prototype on Raspberry Pi incurs
a low overhead, taking 0.0001s for each state transition integrity checking, and 0.063s∼0.211s for the cyber-physical contextual
consistency checking.
Index Terms—Cyber-physical systems, Data-oriented attacks, Program anomaly detection, Cyber-physical execution semantics.
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1 INTRODUCTION
C YBER-physical systems (CPS) consist of a tightly coupledintegration of computational elements and physical compo-
nents. The computational elements rely on sensors to monitor
the physical environment and make control decisions to affect
physical processes with feedback loops [2]. These systems are
widely used to operate critical infrastructure assets, such as electric
power grid, oil and natural gas distribution, industry automation,
medical devices, automobile systems, and air traffic control [3].
In the industrial control domain, CPSs are instantiated as the
Industrial Control Systems (ICS), Distributed Control Systems
(DCS), or Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)
systems [4]. Though CPS and IoT (Internet of Things) are defined
with different emphasis and have no standard definitions agreed
upon by the research community, they have significant overlaps.
In general, CPS emphasizes the tightly coupled integration of
computational components and physical world. While IoT has an
emphasis on the connection of things with networks. If an IoT
system interacts with the physical world via sensors/actuators, we
can also classify it as a CPS [5].
The tight coupling with physical space of CPS brings new
security and safety challenges. Control programs running on CPS
devices monitor physical environments by taking sensory data as
input and send control signals that affect physical systems [6].
They are critical to the proper operations of CPS, as anomalous
program behaviors can have serious consequence, or even cause
devastating damages to physical systems [7]. For example, the
Stuxnet [8] attack allows hackers to compromise the control sys-
tem of a nuclear power plant and manipulate real-world equipment
such as centrifuge rotor speeds, which can be very dangerous.
A preliminary version of this work appeared in [1].
According to ICS-CERT’s report [9], there have been continuously
increasing number of cyber attacks targeting critical infrastructure.
Therefore, securing CPS against malicious attacks becomes of
paramount importance in the prevention of potential damages to
physical systems.
Recent studies [7], [10], [11], [12], [13], [14] have shown that
control programs suffer from a variety of runtime software ex-
ploits. These attacks can be broadly classified into two categories:
• Control-oriented attacks exploit memory corruption vulnerabil-
ities to divert a program’s control flows, e.g., malicious code
injection [15] or code reuse attacks [11]. Control-oriented at-
tacks in conventional cyber systems (i.e., without cyber-physical
interactions) have been well studied [16]. It is possible that
existing detection approaches [17], [18], [19], [20], [21], [22]
are extended to defend against control-oriented attacks in CPS.
• Data-oriented attacks manipulate program’s internal data vari-
ables without violating its control-flow integrity (CFI), e.g.,
non-control data attacks [23], control-flow bending [22], data-
oriented programming [24]. Data-oriented attacks are much
more stealthy than attacks against control flows. Because ex-
isting CFI-based solutions are rendered defenseless under data-
oriented attacks, such threats are particularly alarming. We
mainly focus on runtime software exploits, and thus sensor data
spoofing attacks [25], [26] in the physical domain are out of the
scope in this work.
Since many control decisions are made based on particular
values of data variables in control programs [7], data-oriented
attacks could potentially cause serious harm to physical systems in
a stealthy way. We further categorize data-oriented attacks against
control programs into two types. i) Attacks on control branch,
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2which corrupt critical decision making variables at runtime to
execute a valid-yet-unexpected control-flow path (e.g., allowing
liquid to flow into a tank despite it is full [27] or preventing
a blast furnace from being shut down properly as in the recent
German steel mill attack [28]). ii) Attacks on control intensity,
which corrupt sensor data variables to manipulate the amount of
control operations, e.g., affecting the number of loop iterations to
dispense too much drug [7]).
In many instances, CPS can be modeled as event-driven
control systems [29], [30]. We refer to events as occurrences of
interest that come through the cyber-physical observation process
or emitted by other entities (e.g., the remote controller), and trigger
the execution of corresponding control actions. Defending against
CPS data-oriented attacks is challenging due to the following rea-
sons. First, data-oriented exploits can achieve attack goals without
incurring illegal control flows, thus providing opportunities for
attackers to evade all control flow integrity based detections [24].
Second, CPS programs normally rely on external sensor events to
make control decisions. This physical event-driven nature makes it
difficult to predict runtime program behaviors in CPS. Hence, an
anomaly detection system needs to check the runtime integrity
of program behaviors from both cyber and physical domains.
Unfortunately, there exist very few defenses [7], [31] and they are
ineffective to prevent both attack types due to the lack of runtime
execution semantics checking.
Goals and Contributions. In this paper, we focus on a new
type of runtime attacks that result in inconsistencies between the
physical context/event and program execution, where executed
control flow paths do not correspond to the observed events.
These attacks do not necessarily violate any control flow integrity,
so existing techniques based on control flow checking are not
effective. We point out the need for an event-aware control-
program anomaly detection, which reasons about program behav-
iors with respect to cyber-physical interactions, e.g., whether or
not to open a valve is based on the current ground truth water
level of a tank [27]. None of existing program anomaly detection
solutions [16] has the event-aware detection ability. They cannot
detect attacks that cause inconsistencies between program control
flow paths and the physical environments.
We address the problem of securing control programs against
data-oriented attacks, through enforcing the execution semantics
of control programs in the cyber-physical domain. Specifically,
our program anomaly detection enforces the consistency among
control decisions, values of data variables in control programs,
and the physical environments. Our main technical contributions
are summarized as follows.
• We describe a new security methodology, named Orpheus, that
leverages the event-driven nature in characterizing CPS control
program behaviors. We present a general method for reasoning
cyber-physical execution semantics of a control program, in-
cluding the event identification and event dependence analysis1.
• As an instantiation of Orpheus, we present a new event-aware
finite-state automaton (eFSA) model to detect anomalous control
program behaviors particularly caused by data-oriented attacks
in CPS. By enforcing runtime cyber-physical execution seman-
tics, eFSA detects subtle data-oriented exploits when physical
event are inconsistent with the corresponding event-dependent
state transitions. While our exposition of Orpheus is on an FSA
model at the system call level, the design paradigm of Orpheus
1. Accompanying materials of this work are available at goo.gl/Wkrdzz
can be used to augment many existing program behavior mod-
els, such as the n-gram model [32] or HMM model [33].
• We implement a proof-of-concept prototype on Raspberry Pi
platforms, which have emerged as popular devices for building
CPS applications [7], [34], [35]. Our prototype features: i) A
gray-box FSA model that examines the return addresses on
the stack when system calls are made, and thus significantly
increases the bar for constructing evasive mimicry attacks. ii)
An LLVM-based event dependence analysis tool to extract
event properties from programs and correlate the physical event
with runtime program behaviors, which we refer to as cyber-
physical execution semantics. iii) A near-real-time anomaly
detector using named pipes, with both local and distributed
event verifiers to assess the physical context.
• We conduct a thorough evaluation of eFSA’s performance
through real-world CPS case studies. Results show that our
approach can successfully detect different runtime data-oriented
attacks reproduced in our experiments. Our prototype of the
runtime anomaly detector takes ∼0.0001s to check each state
transition in eFSA model, ∼0.063s for the local event verifica-
tion, and ∼0.211s for the distributed event verification.
2 BACKGROUND AND ATTACK MODEL
In this section, we introduce the CPS background, and describe
the attack model and assumptions of this work. We use examples
to illustrate our new detection capabilities.
2.1 CPS Background
Sensors
Physical Process
Actuators
Events
Control Programs on Field Devices
CPS Control Center
Electrical distribution, manufacturing, 
industrial control, automobile systems, …
Embedded Linux, 
PLC firmware, …
Breakers, switches,
pumps, motors, valves, …
Local Control
Fig. 1: An abstract view of the event-driven CPS architecture. CPS
is exposed with a large attack surface and attacks can be launched
across all components in the system.
Fig. 1 shows an abstract view of the CPS system architecture,
which is also in line with the architecture of modern Industrial
Control Systems (ICS). In industrial control domain, the control
program is often referred to as control logic, and the firmware on
PLC (i.e., field device) acts as a kind of operating system [36].
In general, it is composed of the following components: 1) a
physical process (e.g., industrial plant or smart home); 2) sensors
that measure the physical environment; 3) actuators that trig-
ger physical changes in response to control commands sent by
the control program; 4) control programs running on embedded
devices that supervise and control physical processes by taking
sensory data as input and making local control decisions; 5) a
remote control server (which is optional), letting users remotely
monitor and control the physical process. CPS communicates
with the physical process through sensors and actuators, where
physical environments are sensed and events (e.g., coming from
the environment or emitted by other entities) are detected, and
then actuation tasks are executed through a set of actuators.
Embedded devices (a.k.a. field devices) in CPS are situated in
the field, where their operating systems are typically embedded
3Linux/Windows variants [37] or PLC firmware [36]. Traditionally,
embedded control systems were not considered prominent attack
targets due to their isolation from potential attack sources. How-
ever, the historical isolation has begun to break down as more and
more embedded devices are connected to business networks and
the Internet in the trend of IoT, making CPS control programs
increasingly vulnerable [37].
2.2 Attack Model and Assumptions
In this paper, we make the following security assumptions:
• Capabilities of the adversary. We assume that the adversary
has successfully authenticated CPS field devices (or the control
server) under her control to the local network, and is able
to launch runtime software exploits which may be unknown
or known but unpatched at the time of intrusion. We are not
concerned how attackers gained entry into the devices and
launch different attacks, but focus on uncovering abnormal
program execution behaviors after that [21]. This is a typical
assumption in existing anomaly detection works.
• CPS platform. We assume the initial state (i.e., the training
stage) of the application is trustworthy, which is a general
requirement of most behavior-based intrusion detection sys-
tems [31]. We also assume the runtime monitoring module (run-
ning on the host) is trusted and cannot be disabled or modified.
This assumption is reasonable because it can be achieved by
isolating the anomaly detector (monitoring module) from the
untrusted target program with hardware security support such
as Intel’s TrustLite or ARM’s TrustZone [7]. At the time of
detection, the user space is partially or fully compromised, but
the operating system space has not been fully penetrated yet,
and thus it is still trusted [10].
• Our focus. We focus our investigation on runtime software
exploits, and thus sensor data spoofing attacks in the physical
domain [26] are out of the scope. We assume sensor mea-
surements are trustable. We limit our attention to data-oriented
attacks that involve changes of system call usage. Other data-
related attacks that do not impact observable program behavior
patterns (e.g., modification of non-decision making variables)
are beyond the scope of this work. System call can be used
as an ideal signal for detecting potential intrusions, since a
compromised program can generally cause damage to the victim
system only by exploiting system calls [38]. Despite system call
based monitoring is widely used for detecting compromised pro-
grams, we aim at developing a CPS-specific anomaly detection
system by augmenting an existing program behavior model with
physical context awareness.
2.3 New Detection Capabilities
Our new detection capability is detecting data-oriented attacks
in CPS control programs, including hijacked for/while-loops or
conditional branches. These stealthy attacks alter the underly-
ing control program’s behaviors without tampering control-flow
graphs (CFGs). We illustrate our new detection capabilities using
a smart syringe pump as an example 2. The control program reads
humidity sensor values as well as takes remote user commands,
and translates the input values/commands into control signals to its
actuator. Partial code is shown in Listing 1. Suppose a stack buffer
overflow vulnerability exists in the recvRemoteCommand()
2. https://hackaday.io/project/1838-open-syringe-pump
function (line 3). When the vulnerable function is invoked, an
attacker is able to corrupt the sensor variables (e.g., pressure,
temperature, and humidity) in the program. Our approach
reasons about control programs’ behaviors w.r.t physical environ-
ments, and is able to detect the following attacks:
• Attacking control branch. An attack affecting the code in
lines 5 and 7 of Listing 1 may trigger push-syringe or
pull-syringe regardless of physical events or remote re-
quests. It corrupts control variables that result in event function
push_event or pull_event returning True. Such an
attack leads to unintended but valid control flows.
• Attacking control intensity. An attack may directly or indirectly
corrupt a local state variable (e.g., steps in line 18 of List-
ing 1) that controls the amount of liquid to dispense by the
pump. Such an attack may cause the syringe to overpump than
what is necessary for the physical system. Range-based anomaly
detection would not work, as the overwritten variable may still
be within the permitted range but incompatible with the current
physical context. Such an attack (i.e., manipulating the control
loop iterations) does not violate the program’s CFG either.
1 void loop(...) {
2 readSensors(&pressure,&temperature,&humidity);
3  recvRemoteCommand();/*buffer overflow
vulnerability*/
4 ...
5 A if(push_event()==True)/*Attack control branch*/
6 push_syringe();
7 A else if (pull_event()==True)
8 pull_syringe();
9 }
10 bool push_event() {
11 //decide whether push_event is triggered
12 if(humidity>HUMIDITY_THRESHOLD)
13 return True;
14 return False;
15 }
16 void push_syringe() {
17 //calculate the steps value
18 A steps=humidity-HUMIDITY_THRESHOLD;
19 for(int i=0; i<steps; i++){/*Attack control
intensity*/
20 digitalWrite(motorStepPin,HIGH);
21 delayMicroseconds(usDelay);
22 digitalWrite(motorStepPin,LOW);
23 }
24 }
Listing 1: Examples of data-oriented attacks in a simplified
smart syringe pump application. An attacker could purposely
(a) trigger control actions by manipulating the return value
of push_event or pull_event, and (b) manipulate
the number of loop iterations in push-syringe without
violating the control program’s CFG.
Existing solutions cannot detect these attacks, as the detection
does not incorporate events and cannot reason about program
behaviors w.r.t. physical environments. C-FLAT [7], which is
based on the attestation of control flows and a finite number of
permitted execution patterns, cannot fully detect these attacks.
Similarly, recent frequency- and co-occurrence-based anomaly
detection approaches (e.g., global trace analysis [39] and system
call frequency distribution (SCFD) [31]) cannot detect such either
type of attacks, as their analyses do not model runtime cyber-
physical context dependencies.
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Fig. 2: Workflow of Orpheus event-aware anomaly detection framework, which augments an existing program behavior model with
cyber-physical contextual integrity.
2.4 Definition of Events
Without loss of generality, we define two types of events in control
programs: binary events and control-intensity events. In this work,
the physical context refers to these physical events that trigger a
particular execution path in a CPS program.
• Binary events return either True or False, which are defined
in terms of pre-specified status changes of physical environ-
ments and provide notifications to the control program (e.g.,
push_event or pull_event in Listing 1). Note that though
sensor values such as temperature or humidity have continuous
attributes that would lead to a large input space, binary events
have a binary outcome which indicates a pre-specified status
change is triggered. Such events are commonly pre-defined
and used in CPS/IoT’s trigger-action programming ("if, then")
model [30], [40].
• Control-intensity events correspond to the sensor-driven control
actions within a for/while loop, e.g., sensor values affect the
amount of control operations of push-syringe in Listing 1.
We consider each loop iteration as a discrete event. It is
challenging to identify control-intensity events since they are
not explicitly declared in control programs. We present a general
event identification method in Sec. 4.1.
3 Orpheus ANOMALY DETECTION FRAMEWORK
3.1 Motivation
Runtime software attacks by exploiting memory corruption vul-
nerabilities constitute a major attack vector against CPS [41] [42].
This is because, low-level memory-unsafe languages (e.g., C/C++)
are widely used in embedded systems for speed performance
purposes. As launching control-oriented attacks become increas-
ingly difficult due to many deployed defenses against control-flow
hijacking, data-oriented attacks are considered an appealing attack
technique for system compromise.
Data-oriented attacks can purposely change the underlying
CPS program behaviors and drive the system to unexpected states
in a stealthy way, and thus posing a serious security threat to CPS.
From the example in Listing 1, we observe that runtime control
flows of CPS program are dependent on the external physical
context. A data-oriented attack could lead to an inconsistency
between the physical context and program control flow. This mo-
tivates us to leverage the intrinsic physical context dependency in
CPS control programs as a channel to detect anomalous program
behavior in CPS. Our key idea is to enforce physical context
constraints over existing program behavior models, and check
the consistency between runtime program behavior and external
execution semantics.
3.2 Design Overview
Fig. 2 shows the workflow of Orpheus event-aware anomaly
detection framework, which is a learning-based program anomaly
detection and composed of two stages: training/learning (where
program behavior models are built based on normal program
traces) and monitoring/testing (where a new trace is compared
against the model built in the training phase). In particular, to cap-
ture the cyber-physical context dependency of control programs,
the training stage in Orpheus encompasses both static program
analysis and dynamic profiling.
There are four main steps in the training phase. In step ¬
(Sec. 4.1), Orpheus identifies both binary events and control-
intensity events involved in the control program. In step ­
(Sec. 4.2), it performs the program dependency analysis to gen-
erate event-annotated CFG, which identifies the instructions/state-
ments associated with binary events, and control-intensity loops
associated with control-intensity events. In step ® (Sec. 5.1),
Orpheus constructs the normal program behavior model either
based on static analysis or dynamic profiling, which we refer to
as a basic program behavior model in Orpheus. The next step ¯
(Sec. 5.2) is important. It augments the basic model with event
constraints and obtains the event-aware program behavior model.
Steps ° and ± are the monitoring phase (Sec. 6). In step °,
the anomaly detector (which can be located in the secure world
in ARM TrustZone to provide a trusted execution environment
for trace collection [7] [43]) monitors the program’s execution
and collects runtime traces. The basic program behavior model
normally aims at detecting control-oriented attacks. Our main
contribution lies in the event awareness enhancement on top of
the basic model. In the monitoring phase, whenever an event-
dependent control-flow path is encountered in step ±, the event
verifier checks the consistency between runtime behavior and pro-
gram execution semantics, e.g., whether a specific physical event
associated with an event-dependent control-flow path is observed
in the physical domain. An anomaly is marked if there exists any
deviation from the normal behavior model, or a mismatch between
the physical context and program control-flow path.
3.3 Program Behavior Model Choices
Program behavior modeling has been an active research topic
over the past decade and various models have been proposed
for legacy applications [16]. Existing models can be classified
5into two categories: i) local model (e.g., n-gram model [32],
hidden markov model (HMM) based approach [33], finite-state
automaton (FSA) model [44]); and ii) long-range model (e.g., fre-
quency distribution based models [31], [39], [45]). Local anomaly
detection inspects short-range segments of program execution
traces to detect anomalies such as control-flow violations. Long-
range anomaly detection examines longer system behaviors (e.g.,
a complete program behavior instance) than the local anomaly
detection, which can detect frequency anomalies. Among these
models, system-call based monitoring is widely used for detecting
compromised programs, in comparison to library/function-calls.
N-gram based model defines the normal program behavior for
a process by using short sequences of system-calls. In the training
phase, it builds a n-gram database by sliding a window of length
n over the system-call traces of normal program executions. An
anomaly is detected if a new n-gram is observed in the testing
sequence (i.e., test for membership in the database). Although
short-range ordering of system-calls have a high probability of
being perturbed when abnormal activities occur, it is vulnerable to
mimicry attacks [46]. An attacker may insert a malicious code,
issuing system-calls accepted by a normal behavior model yet
still carries out the same malicious action. Instead of using short
sequences and being limited by length, state-based models use
finite state machine (FSM) to express possible sequences, where
the PC information (i.e., program counters which are the return
addresses of system-calls) are often used in these models.
The design paradigm of Orpheus is to augment physical event
constraints on top of an existing program behavior model. For
example, automaton/state-based models can be enhanced with
event checking on event-dependent state transitions. For the n-
gram model [32], we identify event-dependent n-grams in the
training phase and apply the event checking when observing any
event-dependent n-gram in the monitoring phase. In addition,
control-flow integrity [18], [35] can also be augmented with event
checking before executing control flow transfers. We leave the
option of choosing the underlying basic program behavior model
open to system developers, which may depend on the specific re-
source constraints on CPS platforms. For example, compared with
the n-gram model, tracing PC information in FSA/HMM during
program execution incurs an extra runtime overhead, which we
will demonstrate in Sec. 8. We instantiate the Orpheus framework
using the FSA model [44] in Sec. 5.
4 REASONING ABOUT CYBER-PHYSICAL EXECU-
TION SEMANTICS
In this section, we present a general method for reasoning about
cyber-physical execution semantics of a control program through
static analysis, including the event identification and dependence
analysis.
4.1 Event Identification
In order to discover the triggering relationship between external
events and internal program control flows, we first identify what
events are involved in a control program. For pre-defined binary
events, it is not difficult to identify these events (e.g., given event
functions declared in an event library or header file, we scan the
source code or executable binary). The main challenge is to iden-
tify: i) control intensity events/loops, and ii) non-predefined binary
events. Our LLVM-based [47] event identification algorithm can
automatically extract these events and only requires knowledge of
sensor-reading APIs and actuation APIs on the embedded system.
They are pre-specified sources and sinks3 in our static analysis.
Algorithm 1: Identifying control-intensity events
1 Input: Program P ; Sensor-reading API set APIsens;
Actuation API set APIactu
2 Output: Control-intensity event/loop set Eci
3 Eci ← ∅;
4 Gpdg = ConstructPDG(P) /*construct the program dependence
graph*/;
5 LoopBrSet = getLoopBranchSet(P) /*get all the conditional
branch instructions with loops*/;
6 for BranchInst=getNextInst(LoopBranchSet) do
7 Sbdd = BackwardDataDependence(Gpdg , BranchInst);
8 /*Backward data dependent statements on BranchInst*/;
9 Sfcd = ForwardControlDependence(Gpdg , BranchInst);
10 /*Forward control dependent statements on BranchInst*/;
11 if (Sbdd ∩APIsens 6= ∅ & Sfcd ∩APIactu 6= ∅) then
12 Eci= Eci∪ Event(BranchInst,Sbdd,Sfcd);
13 end
According to the definition of a control-intensity event in
Sec. 2.1, it contains a loop statement (e.g., for/while loop) in
which sensor values affect the amount of control operations. Our
key idea is to search for a loop statement that is data-dependent
on any sensor-reading API, and at least an actuation API is
control-dependent on this loop statement. The search is performed
through backward data dependence analysis and forward control
dependence analysis. Algorithm 1 describes our static analysis
for identifying control-intensity events. We first obtain the LLVM
Intermediate Representation (IR) of a control program P using
the Clang compiler [47], and construct the program dependence
graph (PDG), including both data and control dependencies (Line
4). The control dependence graph is at the basic block level4, while
the data dependency graph is at the granularity of instructions.
Then, we obtain all conditional branch instructions with loops,
by searching the conditional "br" instruction, which takes a single
"i1" value and two "label" values in LLVM IR (Line 5). For each
conditional branch with a loop, we conduct the backward inter-
procedural dataflow analysis to find any prior data dependence
on sensor-reading APIs (Line 7). Then, we conduct the forward
inter-procedural control-dependence analysis on the true branch
of the conditional instruction to find actuation APIs, e.g., APIs in
WiringPi library or functions writing GPIO pins [49] (Line 9). If
a loop statement is data-dependent on external sensor data, and
triggers a certain control action, we identify a control-intensity
event/loop (Line 11). In each iteration, we record the identified
control-intensity event and control intensity loop (Line 12), which
is the output of the event identification process.
A more specific example of our event identification is illus-
trated in Fig. 3 corresponding to the C-based control program
in Listing 1. The figure shows a control-intensity event/loop
represented by LLVM IR after the data dependence and control
dependence analysis (¶). We then locate a conditional branch in-
struction with a loop (·). This conditional branch uses the variable
steps, which is data dependent on a sensor-reading API (¸). On
its true branch, we find an actuation API digitalWrite and
thus we identify the loop as a control-intensity event (¹).
3. Source and sink are terms in a dataflow/taint analysis. The source is where
data comes from, and the sink is where it ends in a program [48].
4. In program analysis, a basic block is a linear sequence of instructions
containing no branches except at the very end.
6<label>:9
call void @digitalWrite(i32 6, i32 1)
...
...
%6 = load i32* %i, align 4
%7 = load i32* @steps, align 4
%8 = icmp slt i32 %6, %7
br i1 %8, label %9, label %14
T F
<label>:14
ret void
Any sensor 
reading API 
Data dependence
Any actuation 
API 
Loop
Control dependence
❶❷❸❹
❷
❸
Locating conditional 
branch instruction 
Backward data 
dependence analysis
Forward control 
dependence analysis
Constructing PDG 
❹
Fig. 3: An example of identifying control-intensity events
We also design a similar procedure for identifying non-pre-
defined binary events. An example of such event is when the hu-
midity exceeds a user-designated value, an event predicate returns
True. In this procedure, we search for the conditional branch
either "br" or "switch" instruction without a loop, and then perform
the same data/control dependence analysis. In particular, we need
to analyze both true and false branches of a "br" instruction,
because both branches may contain control actions and we also
consider the not-happening case (i.e., the branch without triggering
any control action) as an implicit event.
4.2 Event Dependence Analysis
Our event dependence analysis generates an event-annotated CFG,
i.e., approximating the set of statements/instructions that connect
events and their triggered actions. During the event identification,
we identify individual events that are involved in a control pro-
gram. For the control-intensity event/loop, we directly associate it
with the whole loop that contains the sensor-driven control action.
A challenge arises when dealing with nested binary events. We
address the nested events challenge using a bottom-up approach
for recursive searching for event dependencies.
Algorithm 2 describes our event dependence analysis for
nested binary events. Given a binary-event triggered basic block
BBeta, we backward traverse all its control dependent blocks until
reaching the root in a recursive manner, and extract corresponding
branch labels (i.e., True or False). In the recursive function
FindEventDependence (Line 5), once we find a basic block
on which BBcur is control dependent (Line 7), we check whether
it contains any external event (Line 9). If yes, we add this event
together with its branch label to Eb (Line 10). The condition
Eb∩Etmp = ∅ avoids potential loops when including new events
into Eb. Then, we recursively search any upstream event that
BBcur depends on (Line 12).
Fig. 4 illustrates an example of our event dependence analysis
corresponding to Listing 1. Block 7 (i.e., the basic block with
label 7) is control dependent on Block 4 in the True branch
of pull_event (called true-control-dependent). By backward
traversing the control dependence graph, we find Block 4 is
further false-control-dependent on push_event in Block 0.
Then, we know Block 7 is control dependent on a composite event
[push_event∧pull_event]. In this example, we also find Blocks
3 control dependent on push_event, and Block 9 is control
dependent on [push_event ∧ pull_event]. We finally identify
three event-dependent basic blocks, and obtain the corresponding
event-annotated CFG.
In addition to the static analysis approach, an alternative for
event dependence analysis is using dynamic slicing [50], which
Algorithm 2: Event dependence analysis for binary events
1 Input: Event-triggered basic block BBeta; Control flow graph
Gcfg of program P ;
2 Output: Eb: events that trigger the execution of BBeta
3 Eb ← ∅;
4 BBcur = BBeta;
5 Function FindEventDependence (BBcur , Gcfg , Eb)
6 for BBtmp= getNextBB(Gcfg) do
7 if (BBtmp.toid == BBcur) then
8 Etmp=extractEvent(BBtmp) ;
9 if Etmp 6= ∅ & Eb ∩ Etmp = ∅ then
10 Eb= Eb ∪ Etmp;
11 BBcur = BBtmp;
12 FindEventDependence (BBcur , Gcfg , Eb);
13 end
14 return;
<label>:0        ...
%1 = call i32 @push_event()
%2 = icmp ne i32 %1, 0
br i1 %2, label %3, label %4
<label>:4
%5 = call i32 @pull_event()
%6 = icmp ne i32 %5, 0
br i1 %6, label %7, label %9
T F
<label>:3 
call void @push_syringe()
<label>:9
…T F
<label>:7
call void @pull_syringe()
!"#ℎ_&'&()⋀!"++_&'&()dependent	
!"#ℎ_&'&()dependent	
!"#ℎ_&'&()⋀!"++_&'&()dependent	
Fig. 4: Event dependence analysis for nested events
identifies statements triggered by a particular event during multiple
rounds of program executions. It is worth mentioning that our
event identification and dependence analysis is a general approach
for reasoning cyber-physical execution semantics, independent of
specific program anomaly detection models.
5 eFSA: AN INSTANTIATION OF Orpheus
In this section, we describe details about how to build the event-
aware finite-state automaton (i.e., eFSA) model, a system call level
FSA-based instantiation of the Orpheus framework. eFSA captures
the event-driven feature of CPS programs to detect evasive attacks.
5.1 Formal Description of eFSA
We construct the finite-state automaton (FSA) [44] model, which
is based on tracing the system calls and program counters (PC)
made by a control program under normal execution. Each distinct
PC (i.e., the return address of a system call) value indicates a
different state of the FSA, so that invocation of same system
calls from different places can be differentiated. Each system
call corresponds to a state transition. Since the constructed FSA
uses memory address information (i.e., PC values) in modeling
program behaviors (called the gray-box model), it is more resistant
to mimicry attacks than other program models [16], [51].
In an execution trace, given the kth system call Sk and
the PC value pck from which Sk was made, the invocation of
Sk results in a transition from the previous state pck−1 to pck
which is labeled with Sk−1. Fig. 5(a) shows a pictorial example
program corresponding to Listing 1 at the system-call level, where
system-calls are denoted by S0,. . . ,S6, and states are represented
7by integers (i.e., line numbers). Suppose we obtain three exe-
cution sequences, S01
S1
3
S2
6
S3
7
S2
6
S3
7
S5
10
S6
11 ,
S0
1
S1
3
S4
9
S4
9
S5
10
S6
11 , and
S0
1
S1
3
S5
10
S6
11
S1
3
S5
10
S6
11 , the learnt FSA model is shown in Fig. 5(b),
where each node represents a state and each arc represents a state
transition.
S0;
while(…){
S1;
if(push_event())
for(…humidity…){
S2; 
S3;}
else if(pull_event())
for(…){S4;}
S5;
S6;}
1
3
2
4
6
5
7
8
10
9
3
9
6 S3
S0 S1
S1
S51
S6
S2
11S4
S0,…,S6 denote system calls
(a) (b)
7
11
10
S3
S1
Binary event
Control-intensity
loop
Binary 
event
S4
Fig. 5: System-call based finite-state automaton (FSA) model: (a)
the example program of Listing 1 at the system-call level; (b) the
corresponding FSA model.
Our eFSA model extends FSA with external context con-
straints, where event-dependent state transitions in FSA are la-
beled with event constraints. We formally define the eFSA model
as a six-tuple: (S,Σ, s0, F, E, δ). S is a finite set of states which
are PC values, and Σ is a finite set of system calls (i.e., input
alphabet). s0 is an initial state, and F is the set of final states.
E represents a finite set of external events, which can affect the
underlying execution of a control program. δ denotes the transition
function mapping S×Σ×E to S. Note that a state transition may
come with multiple physical events (referred to as a composite
event). Thus, the input alphabet can be expressed as a cartesian
product: E = E1×E2×· · ·×En, where the input E consists of
n concurrent physical events. In particular, we consider the non-
occurrence (not-happening) of one or more events as an implicit
event in eFSA.
3
9
6 S3S0 S1
S1
S51
S6
S2
11S4
7
10
S3
S4
S1
!"# !$% |CIL
Fig. 6: An example of the eFSA model, where E1 represents
push_event, E2 represents pull_event, and CIL represents
the control-intensity event/loop.
Fig. 6 shows an example of eFSA model corresponding to the
FSA example in Fig. 5, where an event dependent transition is
labeled by "[System CallPC ]|Events". In this example, there are two
binary events and one control-intensity event. Through the event
dependence analysis, we identify that lines 5-7 (where S2 and S3
are invoked) and line 9 (where S4 is invoked) are dependent on the
binary events E1 and E2, respectively. To avoid redundancy, we
associate a binary event to the first state transition in FSA that is
dependent on it. In Fig. 6, we identify binary-event dependent state
transitions [S13
S2
6 ]|E1, [S13 S49 ]| E1 ∧E2, and a control-intensity-
event dependent control intensity loop [S26
S3
7 ]|CIL. It also con-
tains an implicit event dependent transition [S13
S5
10 ]|(E1 ∧ E2).
5.2 From Event-Annotated CFG to eFSA
To construct an eFSA model, we need to identify event-dependent
state transitions at the system call level in FSA. Towards this
end, we apply the event dependence analysis results (described
in Sec. 4.1 and 4.2) to transform instruction-level dependencies
in LLVM IR to the state transition dependencies in FSA. Such a
mapping might be achieved through static analysis, e.g., passing
over the parse tree to search for system call invocations. How-
ever, a static analysis based approach requires the modifications
of gcc compiler or system call stubs, and even requires hand-
crafted modifications for library functions [52], [53]. In eFSA,
we adopt a dynamic profiling based approach to discover event
dependent state transitions. We first transform instruction-level
event dependencies in LLVM IR to statement-level dependencies
in source code with line numbers. Then, we map line numbers
and file names to return addresses (e.g., by using the addr2line
tool) that are collected in the dynamic profiling phase when the
FSA model is constructed. In this way, we obtain the system call
level event-dependent state transitions in FSA. Subsequently, we
augment the event-driven information over the underlying FSA,
and finally construct the eFSA model.
5.3 Security Policies in eFSA
eFSA expresses causal dependencies between physical events and
program control flows. By checking execution semantics (i.e.,
enforcing cyber-physical security policies) at runtime, eFSA im-
proves the robustness against data-oriented attacks by increasing
the difficulties that an attack could bypass the anomaly detection.
For state transitions that are dependent on binary events, the
cyber-physical policy enforcement is to make sure the return
values of binary events reflects the ground truth sensor measure-
ments. For control intensity loops that are dependent on control-
intensity events, our approach is based on the control intensity
analysis, which models the relationship between the observable
information in cyber space (i.e., system-calls) and sensor values
in physical space. eFSA then enforces the policy that the observed
control intensity should be consistent with the trend of sensor
value changes.
5.4 Control Intensity Analysis
The main challenge for detecting runtime control intensity anoma-
lies lies in that, given system call traces of a control program,
we need to map the control intensity to its reflected sensor
measurements, where only the number of loop iterations in a
control intensity loop is available. To this end, we first obtain
the number of system calls invoked in each loop iteration. Then,
we model the relationship between sensor measurements and the
amount of system calls in a control intensity loop through a
regression analysis.
Execution Window Partitioning and Loop Detection: Typically,
control programs monitor and control physical processes in a
continuous manner, where the top-level component of a program
is composed of an infinite loop. For instance, an Arduino pro-
gram [54] normally consists of two functions called setup()
and loop(), allowing a program consecutively controls the
Arduino board after setting up initial values. We define an ex-
ecution window as one top-level loop iteration in a continuous
program, and a behavior instance as the program activity within
an execution window. The term execution window is equivalent
to the scan cycle in industrial control domain [34]. We partition
8infinite execution traces into a set of behavior instances based on
the execution window. The underlying FSA model helps identify
loops since it inherently captures program loop structures. We first
identify the starting state in the top-level loop of a FSA. Then,
once a top-level loop back edge is detected, a behavior instance is
obtained.
Regression Analysis: The purpose of the regression analysis
is to quantify the relationship between sensor measurements and
system call amount in a control intensity loop. Given the number
of system calls invoked in each loop iteration, one straightforward
approach is through manual code analysis. In this work, we present
an approach for automating this process. During the identification
of control-intensity events in Sec. 4.1, we know what sensor types
(i.e., sensor reading APIs) are involved in a control intensity
loop. In the training phase, we collect normal program traces
together with the corresponding sensor values. Then, we perform
a simple regression analysis to estimate the relationship between
the system call amount (i.e., outcome) and sensor measurements
(i.e., explanatory variables) for each control intensity loop. For
example, suppose a control intensity loop is triggered by the
change of humidity sensor value (details are in Sec. 8.4). We
observe that an increase of humidity results in more iterations
of the control intensity loop, where each loop iteration incurs 3
system calls. Thus, we can reversely derive the changes of physical
environment by observing the number of iterations in a control
intensity loop.
6 EFSA-BASED DETECTION
In this section, we present how an eFSA-based anomaly detector
detects anomalies particularly caused by data-oriented attacks, and
discuss about the design choices of event verification.
6.1 Runtime Monitoring and Detection
Event Verifier
Unknown Program Traces
State Transition 
Checking
Event Consistency 
Checking
Local 
verification
Distributed 
verification
Detect control-
based anomalies
Detect execution 
semantic anomalies
Normal
Physical 
model 
Fig. 7: eFSA-based anomaly detection
Our anomaly detector traces system calls as well as the cor-
responding PC values during the execution of a control program.
As shown in Fig. 7, the anomaly detection is composed of an
event verifier and two checking steps: i) state transition integrity
checking against the basic FSA model, and ii) event consistency
checking against the event verification in the eFSA-based anomaly
detector, which is our new contribution.
• Event-independent state transition. For each intercepted sys-
tem call, we check if there exists an outgoing edge labelled
with the system call name from the current state in FSA. If
not, an anomaly is detected. If the current state transition is not
event-dependent, we move the current state of the automaton
to the new state. This basic state-transition checking has been
shown to be effective against common types of control-oriented
attacks (e.g., code injection attacks or code-reuse attacks [15])
which violate control flow integrity of the model.
• Event-dependent state transition. In case of an event de-
pendent state transition according to the eFSA model, we first
perform the above basic state-transition checking. More im-
portantly, with the help of the event verification (discussed in
Sec. 6.2), we then check the consistency between the runtime
execution semantics and program’s behavior, i.e., whether a
specific physical event associated with this event-dependent
state transition is observed in the physical domain. This step
can detect stealthy data-oriented attacks that follow valid state
transitions but are incompatible with the physical context. An-
other important aspect is the selection of event checkpoints. To
avoid redundant checking, we set the checkpoint for a binary
event at its first event-dependent state transition. For a control-
intensity event, we perform the event checking after it jumps
out of the control intensity loop.
6.2 Event Verification Strategies
The objective of event verification is to detect event spoofing
caused by runtime data-oriented software exploits. Event verifi-
cation is highly application specific, and it is actually orthogonal
to the eFSA model itself. We describe several possible approaches
for verifying physical context.
• Local event verification: which is able to detect the inconsis-
tency between program runtime behavior and cyber-physical
execution semantics. For example, the monitor re-executes a
binary-event function to confirm the occurrence of the event. To
detect control intensity anomalies, the monitor retrieves sensor
measurements and compares them against the derived sensor
values from system call traces. There may exist false posi-
tives/negatives due to sensor’s functional failures in practice.
• Distributed event verification: which assesses the physical
context by exploiting functionally and spatially redundancy
of sensors among co-located embedded devices. Since sensor
data normally exhibit spatio-temporal correlation in physical
environments, it increases the detection accuracy by involving
more event verification sources.
• Physical model based verification: which is complementary
to the runtime event verification. Cyber-physical inconsistency
may be detected based on physical models [55]. For example,
one may utilize fluid dynamics and electromagnetics as the
basic laws to create prediction models for water system [56]
and power grid [57]. Based on the prediction models and
predefined threat constraints, these methods can then check
whether the predicted environment values are consistent with
a control system’s behavior.
7 IMPLEMENTATION
To demonstrate the feasibility of our approach, we have imple-
mented a prototype with around 5K lines in C/C++, Bash and
Python codes, including the trace collection and preprocessing,
event identification and dependence analysis, eFSA model con-
struction, and runtime anomaly detection modules. Our prototype
uses multiple off-the-shelf tools and libraries in Linux.
We choose Raspberry Pi 2 with Sense HAT as the main
experimental platform, which is a commonly used platform for
building embedded control applications [7], [34], [35]. Sense Hat,
an add-on board for Raspberry Pi, provides a set of environmental
sensors to detect physical events including pressure, temperature,
humidity, acceleration, gyroscope, and magnetic filed. During the
9training phase, we collect program traces on Raspberry Pi and
perform the eFSA model construction on a Linux Desktop (Ubuntu
16.04, Intel Xeon processor 3.50GHz and 16GB of RAM). In the
monitoring phase, the anomaly detector is deployed on Raspberry
Pi to detect runtime control-based or data-oriented attacks. In
the following, we present key implementation aspects in our
prototype.
Dynamic Tracing. We use the system tool strace-4.13 to
intercept system call of a running control program. To obtain the
PC value from which a system call was invoked in a program, we
need to go back through the call stacks until finding a valid PC
along with the corresponding system call. We compile strace
with -libunwind support, which enables stack unwinding and
allows us to print call stacks on every system call.
Event Identification and Dependence Analysis. Our event
identification and dependence analysis tool is implemented within
the Low Level Virtual Machine (LLVM)5 compiler infrastructure,
based on an open source static slicer6 which builds dependence
graph for LLVM bytecode. An advantage of using LLVM-based
event dependence analysis is that, our tool is compatible with
multiple programming languages since LLVM supports a wide
range of languages. Our event identification module identifies the
line numbers in source code where an event is involved. Then,
the event dependence analysis outputs the line numbers of event
dependent statements.
Anomaly Detector with Event Verification. In our prototype,
we implement a proof-of-concept near-real-time anomaly detector
using named pipes on Raspberry Pi, including both local and
distributed verifications (corroboration with single or multiple
external sources). We develop a sensor event library for Raspberry
Pi Sense Hat in C code, based on the sensor reading modules
in experix7 and c-sense-hat8. The event library reads
pressure and temperature from the LPS25H sensor, and reads
relative humidity and temperature from the HTS221 sensor, with
maximum sampling rates at 25 per second. Our local event verifier
calls the same event functions as in the monitored program, and lo-
cally check the consistency of event occurrence. In the distributed
event verifier, we deploy three Raspberry Pi devices in an indoor
laboratory environment. We develop a remote sensor reading
module which enables one device to request realtime sensor data
from neighbouring devices via the sockets communication.
8 EXPERIMENTAL VALIDATION
We conduct CPS case studies, and evaluate eFSA’s detection
capability against runtime data-oriented attacks. Our experiments
aim to answer the following questions:
• What is the runtime performance overhead of eFSA, including
the model training overhead, system-call tracing overhead and
detection latency (Sec. 8.2)?
• Whether eFSA is able to detect different data-oriented attacks
(Sec. 8.3 and 8.4)?
• How feasible is the event-aware n-gram model as an alternative
instantiation of the Orpheus framework (Sec. 8.5)? Whether
eFSA can be generalized to detect network event injection
attacks (Sec. 8.6)?
5. http://llvm.org/
6. https://github.com/mchalupa/dg
7. http://experix.sourceforge.net/
8. https://github.com/davebm1/c-sense-hat
8.1 CPS Case Studies
Solard9. It is an open source controller for boiler and house
heating system that runs on embedded devices. The controller
collects data from temperature sensors, and acts on it by con-
trolling relays via GPIO (general purpose input/output) pins on
Raspberry Pi. Control decisions are made when to turn on or off
of heaters by periodically detecting sensor events. For example,
CriticalTempsFound() is a pre-defined binary event in
Solard. When the temperature is higher than a specified threshold,
the event function returns True.
SyringePump10. It was developed as an embedded application for
Arduino platform. Abera et al. [7] ported it to Raspberry Pi. The
control program originally takes remote user commands via serial
connection, and translates the input values into control signals
to the actuator. SyringePump is vulnerable since it accepts and
buffers external inputs that might result in buffer overflows [7]. We
modify the syringe pump application, where external inputs are
sent from the control center for remote control, and environmental
events drive the pump’s movement. Specifically, in the event that
the relative humidity value is higher than a specified threshold, the
syringe pump movement is triggered. In addition, the amount of
liquid to be dispensed is linearly proportional to the humidity value
subtracted by the threshold. Such sensor-driven syringe pumps are
used in many chemical and biological experiments such as liquid
absorption measurement experiment.
8.2 Training and Runtime Performance
In the training phase, we collect execution traces of Solard and
SyringePump using training scripts that attempt to simulate pos-
sible sensor inputs of the control programs. By checking Solard
and SyringePump’s source codes, our training scripts cover all
execution paths.
We first measure the time taken for training models in our
prototype, where the main overhead comes from the event de-
pendence analysis. Table 1 illustrates eFSA’s program analysis
overhead in the training phase. For comparison purpose, we deploy
the LLVM toolchain and our event dependence analysis tool on
both Raspberry Pi and Desktop Computer (Intel Xeon processor
3.50GHz and 16GB of RAM). From Table 1, Raspberry Pi takes
much longer time (more than 150 times) than desktop computer
to complete the program dependence analysis task. It only takes
0.745s and 0.0035s for event dependence analysis of Solard (46.3
kb binary size) and SyringePump (17.7 kb binary size) on a
desktop computer, respectively. Since Solard and SyringePump
run in a continuous manner and thus generate infinite raw traces.
The model training overhead is measured by how much time
it takes for training per MByte raw trace. Results show that it
takes less than 0.2s to process 1 MByte traces on the desktop
computer. The number of states in Solard’s and SyringePump’s
eFSA is 34 and 65, respectively (not including system-calls in the
initialization before entering the main function).
Event Dependence Analysis
Desktop Computer Raspberry Pi 2
Solard 0.745s 109.975s
SyringePump 0.0035s 1.726s
TABLE 1. Average delay overhead in training phase
9. https://github.com/mrpetrov/solarmanpi
10. https://github.com/control-flow-attestation/c-flat
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Next, we measure the performance overhead incurred by
eFSA’s anomaly detector on Raspberry Pi, including the system-
call tracing overhead and anomaly detection overhead. The
system-call tracing overhead has no difference between FSA and
eFSA, which incurs 1.5x∼2x overhead in our case studies. To
comprehensively measure the runtime system-call tracing over-
head, we further experimentally compare the tracing overhead on
Raspberry Pi using three utility applications (i.e., tcas (1608 test
cases), replace (5472 test cases), and schedule (2650 test
cases)) from the Software-artifact Infrastructure Repository (SIR)
benchmark suite [58]. Fig. 8 shows the results, which measure
the elapsed time between the entry and exit points in the three
utility applications. The baseline refers to the execution time
without tracing. The runtime performance overhead of strace
shows around 96% slowdown on average. When tracing the
callstack information on every system-call, it yields around 112%
slowdown. We discuss the tracing overhead limitation in Sec. 9.
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Fig. 8: System-call tracing overhead on Raspberry Pi
Table 2 reports the runtime anomaly detection latency results.
The average delay for each state transition (i.e., each intercepted
system call) checking out of more than 1000 runs is around
0.0001s. It takes 0.063s on average to perform the local event
checking. The end-to-end latency for the distributed event check-
ing from each co-located device can be broken down into two
main parts: i) network communication around 0.042s, and ii)
sensor reading delay around 0.0582s. In our experiment, we
deploy two co-located devices, and thus the total distributed event
checking delay is around 0.212s. It is expected that the overhead
of distributed event checking is linearly proportional to the number
of event verification sources.
Delay (Raspberry Pi 2) Mean Standard Deviation
FSA State Transition Checking 0.00013293s 0.00004684s
Local Event Verification 0.06279120s 0.00236999s
Distributed Event Verification 0.21152867s 0.03828739s
TABLE 2. Runtime detection overhead in the monitoring phase
8.3 Detecting Attacks on Control Branch
In this experiment, we evaluate eFSA’s security guarantees against
control branch attacks.
8.3.1 Solard
In Solard, we engineer a buffer overflow vulnerability and ma-
nipulate the temperature sensor values to maliciously prevent
the heater from being turned off. This cyber-physical attack is
similar to the recent real-world German steel mill attack [28],
which may result in a blast furnace explosion. In this experiment,
we attach the Raspberry Pi on an electric kettle (i.e., 1-Liter
water boiler). The control program keeps monitoring temperature
values. When the temperature is lower than 50◦C , it turns on the
heater. And when the temperature is higher than 60◦C , where
CriticalTempsFound() is supposed to return True, it turns
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Fig. 9: An instance of Solard experiment
off the heater. In the monitoring phase, when we detect an event-
dependent state transition in eFSA model, the local event verifier
performs event consistency checking.
Fig. 9 illustrates an instance of the Solard experiment. We
corrupt the temperature sensor values in the range of 40∼45◦C ,
which falsifies the return value of CriticalTempsFound()
to be always False. In every scan cycle, eFSA ob-
serves a state transition dependent on the not-happening of
CriticalTempsFound() (i.e., an implicit event), and thus
the event verifier checks the instantaneous temperature value. In
our experiment, because the Raspberry Pi does not physically
interact with the electric kettle, the ground truth temperature
keeps increasing up to more than 80◦C in Fig. 9. However,
eFSA successfully raises an alarm at the first moment when it
finds a mismatch between the execution semantics (temperature
exceeding 60◦C) and program behavior.
We did encounter sensor measurement failures, e.g., isolated
dots as shown in Fig. 9. On average, the false sensor measurement
rate is lower than 1% in our experiments. This means that the
detection rate and false positive/negative rate would depend on
sensors’ functional reliability in practice. Existing methods, such
as data fusion [59] can be applied to enhance the detection
accuracy.
8.3.2 SyringePump
In SyringePump, we set the threshold to 40rH , i.e., when the rel-
ative humidity value is higher than 40rH , it drives the movement
of syringe pump by sending control signals to dispense liquid. The
buffer overflow attack manipulates the humidity sensor values to
purposely trigger event-push control actions without receiving
an external event or environmental trigger. Such an attack leads to
unintended but valid control flows.
Fig. 10 illustrates an example of the experiment. The remote
user command corrupts the humidity sensor value to be 48.56rH ,
which falsifies the return value of event-push to be True. In
case of any event-driven state transition according to eFSA, the
event verifier checks consistency between the runtime execution
semantics (e.g., the instantaneous humidity value) and program
internal state. As shown in Fig. 9, eFSA raises an alarm when it
finds a mismatch between the execution semantics and program
behavior.
8.4 Detecting Attacks on Control Intensity
In this experiment, we demonstrate that eFSA is able to detect con-
trol intensity attacks with only system call traces. In SyringePump,
we set the threshold that triggers the movement of syringe pump
11
Fig. 10: An instance of SyringePump experiment
to be 30rH . The corrupted humidity value determines the amount
of liquid to be dispensed, which equals to the humidity value
subtracted by 30rH in this test. In the training stage, we obtain
the number of system calls invoked in each loop iteration. Then,
we model the relationship between sensor measurements and the
amount of system calls in a control intensity loop. Through control
intensity analysis, we know the number of system calls with no
event occurrence is 40 per scan cycle, and each loop iteration (i.e.,
dispensing a unit of liquid) in the control intensity loop corre-
sponds to 3 system-calls write-nanosleep-nanosleep, as
shown in Fig. 11.
0x12a4
write
0x14b4 0x11a0 0x11b4
write nanosleep
nanosleep
Fig. 11: Control intensity loop in eFSA of SyringePump
Fig. 12(a) shows the value changes of the humidity variable
and system call amount per scan cycle of SyringePump. The
normal humidity value fluctuates between 34 rH and 38rH . As
a result, the amount of liquid to be dispensed is subsequently
changed, which is reflected by the number of system calls in each
control loop. We manipulate the humidity values to be 20rH and
48rH , respectively. In the monitoring phase, by observing the
number of system calls in each control loop, we can reversely
derive the changes of physical environment based on our control
intensity regression model as shown in Fig. 12(b). In this test, if
the difference between the derived value and the sampled average
value from event verifier is larger than 3rH , we consider it an
anomaly. By checking the humidity measurements from two co-
located devices (i.e., denoted as devices 1 and 2), our distributed
event verifier detects that the program’s runtime behaviors are
incompatible with physical contexts. Thus, eFSA successfully
detects the control intensity attacks.
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Fig. 12: An instance of SyringePump experiment with a sampling
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8.5 Event-Aware N-gram Model
To show the feasibility of augmenting the n-gram model with event
awareness, we conduct the case study of the event-aware n-gram
model, which is an alternative instantiation of the Orpheus frame-
work. Given the execution traces of SyringePump in the training
phase, we construct the n-gram model of system-call sequences
(n∈[2,· · ·,10]). For the 2-gram model, there are 35 different 2-
grams. write-write is an event-dependent 2-gram. However,
15 non-event-dependent write-write system-call sequences
are also observed during the monitoring phase, which makes the
event checking no longer effective due to the ambiguity. This is
because, without the PC (return address) information associated
with each system-call, we cannot differentiate the invocation of
the same system-calls from different places in the program. As
a result, we need to increase the length of the n-gram until the
event-dependent n-gram is unique in the model. But there is
no guarantee we can always find the unique event-dependent n-
gram with increasing the value of n. In SyringePump, we find
a unique event-dependent 4-gram write-write-nanosleep-
nanosleep, where the model contains 60 different 4-grams.
During the monitoring phase, our anomaly detector performs the
event checking whenever this event-dependent 4-gram is observed.
Nevertheless, with the increase of n, the size of the n-gram model
also increases. For example, when we increase n to 10, the size of
the n-gram model is increased to 96, which is larger than the size
of eFSA. From this case study, we demonstrate that it is desirable
to use the program counter (PC) information in the basic pro-
gram behavior model, which significantly increases the resistance
against control-flow attacks, but also resolves ambiguities in our
event-aware anomaly detection.
8.6 Extension of eFSA
Control programs running on embedded devices may receive
network events from the control center, and then execute actuation
tasks. Though eFSA mainly detects software-exploit based physical
event spoofing, it is also applicable to network event-triggering
scenarios. For example, a ground control station (GCS) sends a
command to control an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) to change
its flight mode. In this case, we consider each type of control
command as a specific event, and the eFSA model of a UAV
program is augmented with both physical sensing and network
command events. Such an eFSA model can detect false command
injection attacks against the UAV by checking the consistency of
system call traces at a UAV and its GCS, ensuring their system
call invocations conforming to the network API semantics [60].
To demonstrate the applicability of eFSA for detecting net-
work event inconsistency in CPS, we conduct an experiment on
AR.Drone11, which is a remote controlled quadrocopter. Different
from the Solard and SyringePump case studies running on Rasp-
berry Pi, AR.Drone runs on a customized mainboard with embed-
ded Linux. AR.Drone allows a connection to the Telnet port which
leads to a root shell, and thus we are able to deploy the strace
tool to collect system call traces of the UAV control program.
In AR.Drone, the system call types involved in the process that
handles remote commands are quite limited and the program logic
is rather simple. Thus, we can easily construct the corresponding
eFSA model by taking advantage of network protocol interactions
11. https://www.parrot.com/us/drones/parrot-ardrone-20-elite-edition
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without program dependency analysis. Sample traces are included
in the accompanying materials for this paper12.
Since AR.Drone runs with an open Wi-Fi, and we know the
communication protocol between UAV and the GCS [61], we can
easily launch a false command injection attack, which could be
used to send malicious operational data such as status or control
command. We use a laptop (as an attacker) to send fake control
commands to the AR.Drone. Meanwhile, we monitor the network
traffic at GCS using the Wireshark tool. The event verifier could
find inconsistencies between eFSA’s state transitions and network
events captured at GCS, and thus detect this type of attacks. In
this experiment, we do not intend to use eFSA to raise an alarm at
the time of intrusion, instead we aim at detecting the anomalous
behavior as a post-mortem analysis.
9 LIMITATION
Although our work is focused on providing new security capabil-
ities in control-program anomaly detection against data-oriented
attacks, in this section, we examine the limitations of our imple-
mentation and discuss how our method can be deployed in the
near future.
Bare-metal CPS Devices: Our anomaly detection system
works on the granularity of system calls and it leverages dynamic
tracing facilities such as the strace tool, which requires the
operating system support. An important reason behind our choice
is that, the new generation of embedded control devices on the
market are increasingly coming with operating systems [35], [37].
For example, Raspberry Pi devices with embedded Linux OS have
been used as field devices in many CPS/IoT applications [62].
Linux-based PLCs for industrial control have emerged to replace
traditional PLCs [63] for deterministic logic execution. However,
embedded devices may still operate in bare-metal mode [7], where
we can not utilize existing tracing facilities to collect system call
traces. For traditional PLCs, our security checking can be added
to the program logic. We can also apply the event checking idea
to an anomaly detection system at the level of instructions. We
may instrument the original control program with event checking
hooks by rewriting its binary, e.g., inserting hooks at the entry of
event-triggered basic blocks. We consider it as the future work
to extend our design paradigm for fine-grained anomaly detection
with binary instrumentation.
Tracing Overhead and Time Constraints: Though system
call traces are a common type of audit data in anomaly detection
systems, we would like to point out that the conventional software-
level system call tracing incurs unnegligible performance overhead
to the monitored process [64]. It holds for time-insensitive embed-
ded control applications, e.g., smart home automation, but would
be a technical challenge for time-sensitive applications. While we
employ the user-space strace software to collect system calls in
our prototype, tracing tools are orthogonal to our detection design.
For performance consideration, alternative tracing techniques may
be adopted in replacing strace to improve the tracing perfor-
mance [39]. For example, it is possible to improve the performance
for system call interposition by modifying the kernel at the
cost of increased deployment effort. With the recently unveiled
Intel’s Processor Trace (PT) and ARM’s CoreSight techniques,
hardware tracing infrastructures are increasingly embedded in
modern processors, which can achieve less than 5% performance
12. Sample system call traces are provided at goo.gl/Wkrdzz
overhead [65]. The recent work, Ninja [66], offers a fast hardware-
assisted tracing on ARM platforms. The overhead of instruction
tracing and system call tracing are negligibly small. Therefore, we
anticipate that future tracing overhead will be significantly reduced
as the hardware-assisted tracing techniques are increasingly used.
Lack of CPS Benchmark Programs: Lack of CPS bench-
mark programs is one of the challenges in CPS security research
to perform sound evaluation. It is partly because of the diversity
of CPS hardware platforms, and the hardware-dependent nature
of CPS programs. In addition, safety-critical CPS programs are
rarely open-source. As a result, existing CPS security research
work mainly conducted limited case studies [7] [43] [67], instead
of a large scale experimental evaluation. We therefore leave the
comprehensive evaluation of our approach for future work as more
CPS benchmark programs are available. We also would like to
exploit the symbolic execution in our control intensity analysis,
which may statically derive the relationship between sensor values
and the number of control loop iterations. Symbolic execution and
fuzzing techniques are also useful to increase code-coverage in the
training phase for collecting traces of normal program executions.
Limitation of Detection Capability: From our case studies,
we demonstrate that enforcing cyber-physical execution semantics
in CPS program anomaly detection is effective to detect both
types of data-oriented attacks. The necessary condition is that the
observed program behavior at system-call level is incompatible
with the current physical context. Simply corrupting non-control
data in a program’s memory space may be undetectable if the
attack does not result in inconsistencies between the physical
context and program execution, which is out of the scope in
this work. Another limitation of our design is that we only
detect program anomalies at the system-call level. CPS devices
may send control signals by directly writing registers without
issuing any system-call, rendering the system-call based detection
not working. To overcome this limitation, the Orpheus design
paradigm can be extended to the instruction level for fine-grained
anomaly detection.
Anomaly Detection as a Service: Embedded devices are
resource-constrained compared with general-purpose computers.
To reduce detection overhead, the anomaly detection may be
performed at a remote server. We envision deployment involv-
ing partnerships between hardware vendors and security service
providers (similar to ZingBox IoT Guardian [68]), where the
security provider is given access to embedded platforms and helps
clients to diagnose/confirm violations. The client-server architec-
ture resonates with the remote attestation in embedded systems,
which detects whether a controller is behaving as expected [7],
[69]. For detection overhead reduction, the remote server may
choose when and how frequently to send assessment requests to
a control program for anomaly detection. It is also possible to
selectively verify a subset of events for the scalability purpose,
e.g., only safety-critical events specified by developers are in-
volved. While the event verifier implementation is not completely
automated, our event identification and dependence analysis tool
does automate a large portion of event code extraction and eases
the developer’s burden. We leave automatically generating event
verification functions for the anomaly detector as an important part
of our future work.
10 RELATED WORK
Due to the diversity of CPS applications, existing anomaly
detection solutions are proposed to detect specific attacks for
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Research Work Category Approach Security Guarantee Validation
Yoon et al. [31] Program behavior model(cyber) Syscall frequencies Frequency-based program control flow anomaly Raspberry Pi testbed
Feng et al. [74] Network traffic analysis(cyber) Machine learning based traffic analysis Traffic alteration
Traffic data from a gas pipeline
system
Zimmer et al. [10] Timing analysis model(cyber) Static/dynamic timing analysis Code injection attacks Simulation/Testbed
C-FLAT [7] Program behavior model(cyber) Program analysis and instrumentation
Control-oriented attacks and limited
non-control-data attacks Raspberry Pi testbed
FT-RMT [67] Redundant executionanalysis (cyber) Redundant controller and computation CPS faults or attacks
Simulate steer-by-wire application
on embedded Linux
Hadziosmanovic et al. [56] Range-based model(physical)
Attribute values extracted from
network traffic False data injection attacks
Traffic data from water treatment
plants
NoisePrint [75] Noise fingerprinting(physical)
Pattern recognition in sensor and
process noise dynamics Sensor spoofing attacks Two real-world CPS testbeds
Cardenas et al. [4] Physical laws Linear model derived from trainingdata False data injection attacks Simulation
SRID [25] Physical laws Correlation analysis of systemvariables. False data injection attacks Simulation
C2 [76] Control policies(physical) User specified control policies Control signal violation Raspberry Pi testbed
eFSA (Our work) Cyber-physical model Event-aware FSA Data-oriented attacks Raspberry Pi testbed
TABLE 3. Comparison of representative CPS anomaly detection approaches
specific applications, such as smart infrastructures [3], unmanned
aerial vehicles [70], medical devices [71], automotive [72], [73],
industrial control process [4], [34], [55]. The majority of research
efforts in this area thus far have concentrated on behavior model-
based anomaly detection [55], and can be generally classified into
two categories: 1) cyber model (e.g., program behavior model,
network traffic analysis, or timing analysis); 2) physical model
(e.g., range-based model or physical laws). Our proposed eFSA
analyzes both the cyber and physical properties of CPS, as well as
their interactions. Thus, we refer to it as the cyber-physical model.
Table 3 compares representative CPS anomaly detection solutions.
• Program behavior model. Regarding the CPS anomaly detection
based on program behavior models in the cyber domain, Yoon et
al. [31] proposed a lightweight method for detecting anomalous
executions using the distribution of system call frequencies.
The frequencies are for individual system calls, i.e., 1-grams.
The authors in [20] proposed a hardware based approach
for control-flow graph (CFG) validation in runtime embedded
systems. McLaughlin et al. [34] presented the Trusted Safety
Verifier (TSV) to verify safety-critical code executed on pro-
grammable controllers, such as checking safety properties like
range violations and interlocks of PLC programs. C-FLAT [7]
instruments target control programs to achieve the remote at-
testation of execution paths of monitored programs, and the
validity of control flow paths is based on static analysis. Given
an aggregated authenticator (i.e., fingerprint) of the program’s
control flow computed by the prover, the verifier is able to
trace the exact execution path and thus can determine whether
application’s control flow has been compromised. C-FLAT [7] is
the most related work to our approach. Both C-FLAT and eFSA
target at designing a general approach for detecting anomalous
executions of embedded systems software. However, C-FLAT
is insufficient to detect data-oriented attacks due to the lack
of runtime execution context checking. It can only partially
detect control intensity attacks with the assumption of knowing
legal measurements of the target program. However, if the legal
measurement covers a large range of sensor values, attacks can
easily evade its detection because it does not check runtime
consistency between program behavior and physical context.
• Traffic-based model. Control systems exhibit relatively simpler
network dynamics compared with traditional IT systems, e.g.,
fixed network topology, regular communication patterns, and
a limited number of communication protocols. As a result,
implementing network-based anomaly detection systems would
be easier than traditional mechanisms. Feng et al. [74] presented
an anomaly detection method for ICS by taking advantage of
the predictable and regular nature of communication patterns
that exist between field devices in ICS networks. In the training
phase, a base-line signature database for general packages is
constructed. In the monitoring phase, the authors utilize Long
Short-Term Memory (LSTM) network based softmax classifier
to predict the most likely package signatures that are likely
to occur given previously seen package traffic. The anomaly
detector captures traffic anomalies if a package’s signature is not
within the predicted top k most probable signatures according
to the LSTM-based model.
• Timing-based model. Several studies utilized timing information
as a side channel to detect malicious intrusions. The rationale
is that execution timing information is considered an important
constraint for real-time CPS applications, and mimicking timing
is more difficult than mimicking the execution sequence. To
this end, Zimmer et al. [10] used the worst-case execution
time (WCET) obtained through static analysis to detect code
injection attacks in CPS. Such timing-based detection technique
is realized by instrumenting checkpoints within real-time appli-
cations. Sibin et al. [77] focused on detecting intrusions in real-
time control systems. Yoon et al. [78] presented SecureCore,
a multicore architecture using the timing distribution property
of each code block to detect malicious activities in real-time
embedded system. Lu et al. [21] investigated how to reduce
timing checkpoints without sacrificing detection accuracy in
embedded systems.
• Redundant execution analysis. Munir et al. [67] presented an in-
tegrated approach for the design of secure and dependable auto-
motive CPS by conducting the steer-by-wire (SBW) case study.
To provide fault tolerance (FT) to SBW applications, they pro-
posed the FT-RMT (redundant multi-threading) scheme, which
executes safety-critical computations on redundant threads and
detects an error if observing a mismatch between the two
threads’ output. However, introducing redundant controllers into
CPS incurs high cost such as increased code size and reduced
performance. In addition, under our threat model, attackers may
be able to compromise redundant controllers to evade detection.
• Range based model. Enforcing data ranges is the simplest
method to detect CPS anomalies in the physical domain. As
long as sensor readings are outside a pre-specified normal range,
the anomaly detector raises an alarm. Hadziosmanovic et al.
[56] presented a non-obtrusive security monitoring system by
deriving models for PLC variables from network packets as the
basis for assessing CPS behaviors. For constant and attribute
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series, the proposed detection approach raises an alert if a value
reaches outside of the enumeration set. However, range-based
detection suffers from a low detection rate because it neglects
the program’s execution context, e.g., if the legal measurement
covers a large range of sensor values, attacks can easily evade
its detection.
• Sensor and process noise fingerprinting. Ahmed et al. [75]
proposed the NoisePrint, a CPS attack detection method based
on process noise patterns (e.g., fluid sloshing in a storage tank)
of the system. The intuition behind NoisePrint is that, sensor
and process noise variations exhibit unique patterns among
different processes. Therefore, it is hard for attackers to repro-
duce or control these noise variations, making them an ideal
side information for CPS anomaly detection. In the training
phase, a combined fingerprint dictionary for sensor and process
noise is built under regular operations. Under sensor spoofing
attack, noise pattern deviates from the fingerprinted pattern is
considered an anomaly. However, this approach requires an
accurate noise measurement, which is subject to the ambient
background noise in a process plant.
• Physical laws. The idea of using physical models to define
normal operations for anomaly detection is that, system states
must follow immutable laws of physics. Wang et al. [25]
derived a graph model to defeat false data injection attacks in
SCADA system. It captures internal relations among system
variables and physical states. Cho et al. [72] presented a brake
anomaly detection system, which compares the brake data with
the norm model to detect any vehicle misbehavior (e.g., due
to software bugs or hardware glitches) in the Brake-by-Wire
system. Other examples include utilizing fluid dynamics and
electromagnetics as the basic laws to create prediction models
for water system [56] and power grid [57], respectively. Based
on the prediction models and predefined threat constraints,
these methods check whether sensor readings are consistent
with the expected behaviors of a control system. Cardenas et
al. [4] proposed a physical model based detection method by
monitoring the physical system under control, and the sensor
and actuator values. The authors also proposed automatic re-
sponse mechanisms by estimating the system states. Urbina et
al. [55] discussed the limitations of existing physics-based
attack detection approaches, i.e., they cannot limit the impact
of stealthy attacks. The authors proposed a metric to measure
the impact of stealthy attacks and to study the effectiveness of
physics-based detection.
• Control policies. Physical model can also be specified by control
policies. The main purpose of the policies is to improve the
survivability of control systems, i.e., without losing critical
functions under attacks. For example, McLaughlin et al. [76]
introduced a policy enforcement for governing the usage of CPS
devices, which checks whether the policy allows an operation
depending on the state of the plant around the time the operation
was issued. The policies specify what behaviors should be
allowed to ensure the safety of physical machinery and assets.
• Cyber-physical model. Such a model captures the cyber-
physical context dependency of control programs. Our proposed
eFSA characterizes control-program behaviors with respect to
events, and enforces the runtime consistency among control
decisions, values of data variables in control programs, and the
physical environments. Thus, it is able to detect inconsistencies
between the physical context and program execution.
As shown in Table 3, cyber models and physical models
have different security guarantees. The former targets at detecting
CPS control program anomalies in the cyber domain. While the
latter mainly focuses on detecting false data injection attacks in
the physical domain [57]. The cyber-physical interaction (i.e.,
interactions between cyber components and physical components)
in CPS makes it challenging to predict runtime program behaviors
through static analysis of the program code or model training. Ex-
isting cyber models [7], [31] are effective against control-oriented
attacks, however, insufficient to detect data-oriented attacks. An
effective CPS program anomaly detection needs to reason about
program behaviors with respect to cyber-physical interactions,
e.g., the decision of opening a valve has to be made based on
the current water level of the tank. ContexIoT [30] provides
context identification for sensitive actions in the permission grant-
ing process of IoT applications on Android platforms. Though
both ContextIoT and eFSA consider execution contextual integrity,
ContextIoT does not support the detection of data-oriented attacks.
Distinctive from existing works in this area, our Orpheus
focuses on utilizing the event-driven feature in control-program
anomaly detection and our program behavior model combines
both the cyber and physical aspects. Consequently, physics-based
models, which can be inherently integrated into our approach
to enhance security and efficiency, do not compete but rather
complement our scheme. Stuxnet attack [8] manipulated the nu-
clear centrifuge’s rotor speed, and fooled the system operator by
replaying the recorded normal data stream during the attack [36].
Since eFSA’s detection is independent on the history data, it makes
Stuxnet-like attacks detectable in eFSA by detecting runtime incon-
sistencies between the physical context (runtime rotor speed) and
the control program’s behavior. In addition, attackers may exploit
hardware vulnerabilities [79] to manipulate data in memory so as
to launch attacks on control branch or control intensity. eFSA is
also able to detect anomalies caused by such hardware attacks.
11 CONCLUSION
In this work, we presented Orpheus, a new security mechanism for
CPS control programs in defending against data-oriented attacks,
by enforcing cyber-physical execution semantics. As an FSA-
based instantiation of Orpheus, we proposed the program behavior
model eFSA, which advances the state-of-the-art program behavior
modelling. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first program
behavior model that integrates both cyber and physical proper-
ties to defend against data-oriented attacks. We implemented a
proof-of-concept prototype to demonstrate the feasibility of our
approach. Real-world case studies demonstrated eFSA’s efficacy
against different data-oriented attacks. As for our future work, we
plan to integrate physics-based models into our approach, design
robust event verification mechanisms, and extend the Orpheus
design paradigm to support actuation integrity for fine-grained
anomaly detection at the instruction level without the need of
tracing facilities. We also plan to investigate the scalability of our
approach on program size and complexity.
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